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Mobility as a contradictory resource: peripatetic Qur’anic students in 
Kano, Nigeria 
Mobility is a powerful resource young people can draw on to improve their lives, but it 
can also entail risks. This paper explores how mobility becomes a contradictory 
resource for peripatetic Qur’anic students (almajirai) in Kano State in northern Nigeria. 
Moving to urban areas allows the young almajirai to escape difficult conditions and to 
access educational and income opportunities absent at their rural homes. It makes it 
possible for them to adopt self-conceptions as migrants in search of sacred knowledge 
who were once widely respected. However, economic decline has made survival in the 
city more difficult. Lacking the economic and cultural resources to participate in 
displays of status, and without social superiors to speak for them, the almajirai feel they 
have become fair game for those searching for scapegoats. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Mobility as a contradictory resource 
A ‘new mobilities paradigm’ or ‘mobility turn’ within the social sciences has been 
advocated to capture the fact that today ‘[a]ll the world seems to be on the move’ (Sheller and 
Urry 2006, 207). But ‘[p]eople and things have always moved and mobility did not start in the 
twenty-first century’ (Cresswell 2010, 555). The emerging body of literature on mobilities, 
new or otherwise, has however sharpened our understanding of people’s movements in 
important ways. It has been argued for instance that not everyone has an equal relationship to 
mobility (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006, 3) and that ‘vast inequalities characterize not only 
the freedom to move but also the distribution of gains from movement’ (UNDP 2009, 10).  
A growing body of literature engages with the role mobility plays in the lives of young 
people, including how their movement in physical space relates to opportunities for social 
mobility (e.g. Gough 2008; Hansen 2005). It has been shown that for young people, 
geographical mobility matters as a potential asset to complete youth transitions successfully. 
It may allow them to tap new opportunities in terms of education, income, or experience (e.g. 
Crivello 2009; Porter et al. 2013; Punch 2007). But young people may also ‘find themselves 
moving around with little reward’ (Langevang and Gough 2009, 753), and they may 
encounter not merely new chances, but also new risks.  
How young migrants, as strangers and newcomers, deal with assaults on their dignity 
and (re-) construct their identities in the often hostile environments of their new ‘homes’ has 
been documented amongst others for young refugees (e.g. Adams 2009; Mann 2012). Several 
authors describe how street children navigate the various exclusions they experience (e.g. 
Beazley 2003; van Blerk 2005). It is to this emerging literature on the struggles for dignity 
and (self-) respect of young people presumably ‘out of place’ that this paper adds. 
Often, stark socioeconomic inequalities between regions and households shape young 
migrants’ trajectories, for example when rural children and youths move to urban areas to 
work as domestics (e.g. Jacquemin 2004; Thorsen 2012). This paper asks how mobility 
becomes a contradictory resource for young migrants in a context where inequalities are 
pervasive. The stigma attached to poverty may lead poor young migrants to embrace 
discourses about themselves and the reasons for their migration that belie the role of structural 
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factors. The young peripatetic Qur’anic students (almajirai, sg.: almajiri) that this paper is 
about, upon coming to Kano city in Nigeria’s Muslim north, embrace self-conceptions as 
devoted searchers for sacred knowledge to counter the denigration and scorn they experience 
in the urban middle-class neighbourhoods of their schools. Such self-conceptions downplay 
the role poverty plays for rural families’ decisions to enrol children as almajirai. It is 
important to think through the workings of discourses that stigmatise poor migrants, as these 
discourses may develop a dynamic of their own, and constrain the room available to debate 
the structural causes of poverty. 
The next section introduces the almajirai, and the methods used to collect the data. 
Secondly, I trace how changes in the local political economy during the past century relegated 
the almajiri system – once a reliable preparation for successful adult life – to the economic, 
social and political margins. Simultaneously, viable ‘modern’ educational avenues were not 
opened up for poor rural communities. In an increasingly individualistic society, the almajirai 
today are mostly discussed in terms of personal failure. Parental neglect, ignorance and 
backwardness are keywords in a discourse that pathologises the almajirai’s mobility and 
ultimately blames the poor for their own squalor.  
The final section investigates the role of mobility in the lives of the almajirai. By 
moving to urban areas, they can escape difficult conditions and access educational and 
income opportunities absent at home. Also, it becomes possible for them to adopt self-
conceptions as migrants in search of sacred knowledge. Once, migrant scholars were highly 
regarded. Yet, economic decline has made survival in the city more difficult and today, the 
almajirai struggle for respect. They lack the economic and cultural resources to participate in 
displays of status, and don’t have social superiors to speak for them. Lingering at the bottom 
of the status hierarchy, the almajirai feel that they have become fair game for those searching 
for scapegoats.  
 
1.2. Who are the almajirai? 
The almajirai are boys and young men from primary-school age to their early twenties 
who are enrolled in ‘residential colleges’ beyond the state’s purview and regulatory 
interventions. Many schools lack physical infrastructure beyond a canopied forecourt where 
the teaching takes place, compelling their students to cohabit other spaces like mosques or 
neighbours’ entrance halls (soro). The almajirai learn to read, write, and recite the Holy 
Qur’an. Modern/secular or Islamic subjects other than the Qur’an do not form part of their 
curriculum. During the lesson-free time, the almajirai earn their livelihood. In rural areas, 
they collect fodder and firewood or work as farmhands. In urban areas, older students wash 
clothes, carry loads and engage in petty trade or handicrafts. Younger students are employed 
as household helps, or beg for food and money on the streets, which makes them a highly 
visible feature of the urban landscape. The perception is that formerly almajirai lived mainly 
in remote rural locales, but that today they increasingly populate the urban centres of the 
region. 
The traditional Qur’anic school system is widespread in Muslim West Africa and used 
mostly by poor rural families. Such families often have few alternative educational choices as 
the modern schooling accessible to them tends to be both poor in quality and financially 
burdensome. In the almajiri system, children are handed over to the teacher (malam), who 
receives no salary but lives off the support given by the local community, the alms received in 
exchange for his spiritual services, the contributions of his students and supplementary 
income-generating activities. Most teachers are themselves products of the almajiri system. 
While many students return home at least once a year (for the major holidays or to help their 
parents farm), others do not see their parents for years. Some teachers migrate with their 
schools following seasonal agricultural patterns.  
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In Nigeria, the almajirai have become the subject of much public concern in the 
context of increased attempts to achieve universal primary education (e.g. UBEC 2010). The 
push by Islamic reform movements for the formalisation of religious learning has intensified 
struggles over the legitimacy of different avenues to sacred knowledge. The current spate of 
violence related to the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency has exacerbated anxieties about 
Islamic radicalisation and militancy. The Muslim militant group developed at the beginning 
of the century in Borno State in north-eastern Nigeria out of the following of the radical 
preacher Shaikh Muhammad Yusuf. Since the police crushed an uprising of the sect in 2009, 
assassinating its leader and killing some 700 presumed followers, violence has been spiralling 
out of control with almost daily bombings and drive-by shootings especially in the north-east 
of the country.  
Many have jumped to the conclusion that the Islamist sect finds easy recruits in 
traditional Qur’anic schools (e.g. Bagaji et al. 2012). Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka (2012) 
declared in an article in the Newsweek Magazine about Boko Haram that the “butchers of 
Nigeria” have “been deliberately bred… in madrassas and are generally known as the 
almajiris. From knives and machetes, bows and poisoned arrows they have graduated to AK-
47s, homemade bombs, and explosive-packed vehicles.” Other authors have declared the 
almajirai’s deprived living conditions responsible for violence (e.g. Ogunrotifa 2013; Onuoha 
2011). Almajirai may well be, and probably are, amongst the followers of Boko Haram. But 
there is no systematic evidence to support such assertions. What empirical evidence exists 
refutes the “simplistic application of economic deprivation theory” (“The Popular Discourses 
of Salafi Radicalism” 2012, 118).  
Enrolment in Qur’anic schools all over Nigeria is estimated to exceed 9.5 million, 
with more than 8.5 million in the northern part of the country (UBEC 2010). How many of 
these students are almajirai is, however, subject to speculation, as the existing statistics do not 
differentiate between day-students (who stay with their parents, potentially attend modern 
school in addition to Qur’anic school, and include females) and ‘boarding’ students. Over 
80% of all children and youths aged 6–21 years in Kano State are estimated to attend some 
form of Islamic education either in addition to attendance in a secular school, or as their only 
educational experience. Qur’anic ‘boarding’ schools exist alongside Qur’anic day-schools and 
follow largely the same curriculum. Modernised Islamiyya schools teach not only the Quran, 
but also other Islamic and in some instances secular subjects. The most reliable estimate for 
Kano suggests that some 300,000 boys and young men – more than an eighth of all 6–21-year 
olds – live as almajirai in that state (Ministry of Education 2008).  
 
1.3. Methods and data 
This paper builds on 13 months of fieldwork carried out in Kano State in northern 
Nigeria between 2009 and 2011. My fieldwork included four months in Albasu, a small rural 
town in Albasu Local Government Area (LGA) in the east of Kano State. Albasu, largely 
dependent on agriculture, is amongst the poorest areas in Kano State. For the remaining nine 
months, I lived at Sabuwar Kofa within Kano’s Old City. I collected data in the form of 
fieldwork observations, semi-structured interviews, group conversations and casual 
interactions with almajirai, their parents, caregivers, and teachers as well as former almajirai. 
To gauge in what environment the almajirai find themselves, I collected data on discourses 
about them from media records (national and international English-language news, and 
internet sources including blogs and online forums), official narratives, institutional 
publications (from local and international organisations working with children), local 
academic production, and my field notes of conversations and phrases I overheard.  
In addition, I draw on data from the production process of a participatory documentary 
film/docu-drama, which I organised during my research about the perspectives of almajirai 
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on their lives and the challenges they face. This includes stories narrated or written down 
during the script writing process, as well as discussions about the way they would like to see 
their lives and identities represented on screen. The nine participating youths were aged 
between 15 and 20 years, and came from three different Qur’anic schools in which I had 
previously taught English. Some were selected by their teachers to participate, others 
participated because they were the oldest students in their school and therefore the ‘natural’ 
choice. Finally, I invited youths to participate whom I had known and worked with since my 
first visit in Nigeria and whom I was therefore particularly close to. Mindful that such 
sampling would to some extent limit the generalisability of my findings, I felt it was 
important for participants to be relatively self-confident and outspoken and of roughly similar 
age to ensure a good and balanced working atmosphere. Also, to make sure that no problems 
would arise for the almajirai in their schools, their teachers’ consent to their participation in 
the project was essential.  
For other parts of my research, it was easier to include almajirai who were younger or 
less self-confident than the youths participating in the film project. My research includes 
discussions of the photographs that young almajirai took with disposable cameras, and ‘radio 
interviews’ they conducted amongst each other with my tape recorder. Being able to take the 
recorder with them to conduct their interviews outside the purview of adults put them at ease, 
and the playful form encouraged otherwise timid children to speak out.  
The next section discusses the context of the almajiri system past and present. It traces 
the decline of this once highly reputed educational institution to the economic, social and 
political margins, and takes stock of the – overwhelmingly negative – discourses that circulate 
about it today in Nigeria. 
 
2. Context of the almajiri system 
2.1. Historical decline of a once prestigious institution 
Since the inception of Islam in what is today northern Nigeria, the religious 
knowledge possessed by ‘traditional’ Islamic scholars has been a political asset, as its Muslim 
rulers, by submitting to the restraints of a written code, exposed themselves to the checks of 
intellectuals educated in that code (Last 1993). The introduction of modern education by the 
British, who conquered what is today northern Nigeria at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, gradually undermined the religious scholars’ ‘monopoly over literacy’ and thus their 
access to prestige, positions, and resources (Paden 1973). Upon independence in 1960, the 
first generation of modern-educated Muslims inherited power from the British (Umar 2001).  
Socioeconomic change added momentum to the political transformation. Since the 
1970s the income of students and teachers declined as more affluent Muslims increasingly 
ceased to support the almajiri system through alms and accommodation, and as those 
segments of society still endorsing it were hard hit by the economic downturn in the aftermath 
of the oil boom of the 1970s and by structural adjustment which began in 1986 (Ya’u 2000). 
New capital-intensive innovations such as modern cement rather than labour-intensive mud-
construction undermined the almajirai’s traditional income generating activities. The push of 
the northern Muslim elites in the late 1970s and 1980s to extend modern education to larger 
parts of the population increased competition for jobs in the urban economy (Lubeck 1985). 
Meanwhile, those sources of income that are the preserve of ‘traditional’ religious scholars – 
commissioned prayers and potions to strengthen one’s charisma for example (see Last 1988) 
– while providing a profitable livelihood to some, can’t sustain the bulk of the almajirai, and 
particularly not those only beginning to acquire the requisite knowledge. The establishment of 
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a modern system of Islamic education (Islamiyya schools) over the second half of the 
twentieth century marginalised the almajiri system further.  
 
2.2. Poverty, inequality and shame  
It is widely acknowledged today that for people’s wellbeing it is not merely absolute 
but also relative deprivation that matters, for it indexes experiences of marginality and 
exclusion. Katz writes about her field site in rural Sudan that in the wake of its incorporation 
into the capitalist global economy ‘greater awareness of what is to be had not only increased 
desire, but made not having more apparent and painful than before’ (2004, 227). In Nigeria, 
income inequality has risen dramatically since the beginning of structural adjustment in 1986, 
especially in the North West. Relative povertyi soared from 27% in 1980 to 54% in 2004 
(Aigbokhan 2008, 11–14). Economic change entailed the individualisation of society, and an 
increasing commodification of social relationships.  
As economic restructuring accentuated income inequalities and impoverished large 
parts of the population, the landscape of religious legitimacy in Nigeria was reconfigured. In 
both Christianity and Islam, new religious movements emerged that provided the ethic to 
match the new individualistic and acquisitive economic spirit. In Christianity, Pentecostalism 
introduced the so-called ‘gospel of prosperity’. According to Ibrahim and Ehrhardt, it 
‘reverses the anti-materialism associated with the early Church and justifies, and indeed, 
legitimises the acquisition of material wealth. In this context, it has been a major ideologue 
for liberal economic thinking and the promotion of capitalism’ (2012, 7; cf. Freeman 2012). 
Amongst Muslims, reformist movements – most prominently epitomised by the 
‘Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reestablishment of the Sunna’ commonly 
referred to as Izala (see, for example, Kane 2003; Loimeier 1997) – garner increasing support 
in the formerly Sufi dominated region. Kane writes that Izala appealed to the ‘nouveaux 
riches’ brought forth by the oil boom, who sensed that ‘some traditional values and 
institutions hampered their economic goals and curtailed their autonomy.’ Religious 
reformism allowed them to eschew ‘costly traditional practices of wealth redistribution’ 
(2003, 237). The next section explores how such religious repositionings reverberate in 
discussions about the almajirai. 
 
2.3. Discourses surrounding almajirai 
The sight of scruffy-looking children with begging bowls is likely to cause discomfort 
to wealthy Muslims, who are aware that Islamically the umma (Muslim community) is 
collectively responsible for its poor members. Many northern/Hausa Muslims consider the 
almajirai’s practice of begging and their apparent destitution a ‘weak spot’ of the umma, 
making it vulnerable to criticism by southerners/Christians (e.g. Tilde 2009). Yet the 
embarrassment that the almajiri system causes is not due only to the obscene disparities in 
wealth and opportunities in the north, and the evident failure to address them (which the 
almajirai exemplify). Both northerners and southerners, Muslims and Christians alike, frame 
the almajirai as the product of a ‘culture of poverty’. Often the almajiri system is criticised as 
Hausa cultural accretion to Islam, and it is pointed out that Islam permits begging only in 
acute emergencies (e.g. Bambale 2007). The almajirai, conversely, are described as preferring 
begging to ‘work’, and learning ‘laziness’ and a ‘culture of dependence’ (e.g. Aluaigba 2009; 
Ndagi 2012). By conceiving of begging as a cultural evil, its basis in material circumstances 
can be ignored. 
The poor rural constituencies opting for the almajiri system are described as 
‘backward’ in their aspirations and unable to appreciate the benefits of modern education, 
 7 
enrolling their wards instead in a system out of tune with the ‘exigencies of modern times’ 
(Saidu 2010). They are accused of producing more children than they can take care of, to then 
deliver them to a life of misery as ‘street children’ (“The Almajiri Education Foundation” 
2012) and quasi-orphans (e.g. COCFOCAN), ‘forsaken by their parents’ (Shehu 2010) and 
‘totally neglected’ (“NGO Works to Improve Muslim Education” 2007). Bala Muhammad, 
then head of a Kano State directorate created to promote morals and good behaviour, for 
instance, chides ‘parents who have more children than they can afford and see Koranic 
schools as a means to rid themselves of the extra burden’ (Abubakar 2009). Sule-Kano, 
academic at Usmanu Danfodiyo University Sokoto, writes that under conditions of poverty, 
‘Almajirci [the practice of living as almajiri]… became a perfect excuse to some parents to 
reduce the burden of rearing children’ (2008, 6). Aishatu Jibrin Dukku, Nigeria’s Minister of 
State for Education at that time, claims that the almajirai’s parents are ‘so insensitive to the 
welfare of their children that they dispatch them to unknown places to take care of 
themselves’ (“Nigeria’s 10mn Child Beggars” 2009). 
While it is acknowledged that many of those opting for the almajiri system do so out 
of poverty, few attempts are made to understand the structural causes of their poverty, or the 
ways in which they make sense of the constraints they are subjected to. Buzzwords such as 
‘parental neglect’ and ‘ignorance’ dominate the discussion rather than the acknowledgement 
that those sending their children as almajirai may make an informed choice in a context 
offering few alternatives. Ultimately, the burden of blame is put on the poor. Yet, this is 
inherently dangerous as it may give rise – and legitimacy – to government policies that 
penalise the poor rather than address their grievances (cf. Wacquant 2003). Since the 
escalation of violence associated with Boko Haram, there have been increasingly frequent 
calls for restrictions on the almajirai’s mobility and even an outright ban on the system. The 
Northern Traditional Rulers’ Council for example suggests such a ban (Folaranmi 2011). 
Plateau State outlawed street begging by school-aged children in 2009, and on federal level a 
similar law is in the legislative pipeline. 
 
3. Coping strategies of the poor 
3.1. Escaping difficult conditions and accessing opportunities absent at home 
Almajiri education today promises neither access to political power nor to high social 
status. Its former economic viability has largely been undermined and its religious merit come 
under attack. Those participating in it may soon find themselves criminalised – so why do 
people still opt for the system, one may wonder? Hopes for better opportunities for oneself (in 
the case of older students) or one’s wards (in the case of parents and guardians) as well as the 
hope to overcome problems at home underpin the migration of children and youths/young 
adults to urban areas as almajirai. Structural factors such as the decline of the rural economy 
and the population more than quadrupling since 1950 (UN 2010) constrain the opportunities 
available to poor peasant households in rural areas. This has contributed to perpetuate both 
poverty and educational disadvantage.  
The appeal of, and consequently demand for, modern education is low as its quality 
and returns in terms of employment compare poorly to its costs, particularly in rural areas. 
Low levels of education spending, high pupil/classroom ratios, and low teacher qualification 
account for poor learning outcomes (e.g. Ministry of Education 2008; Johnson 2010). While 
basic education is officially free, in reality it implies recurrent expenses: for text books and 
writing materials, uniforms, charges for the rehabilitation of decaying school facilities, levies 
to buy chalk, brooms, report cards, etc. Post-primary education in particular has its price – 
starting with the bribe sometimes required to secure one of the limited places – and often 
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requires students to commute or board. Tomasevski (2005) argues that only education that 
doesn’t imply opportunity costs – e.g. in the form of foregone income or benefit from 
children’s work – can be considered truly free. The situation in much of Kano State is very far 
from this ideal, and modern education is inaccessible to many poor children. 
It is a widely held tenet in Hausa society that every child should attend school; failing 
to enrol a child is tantamount to letting him ‘go to waste’ (lalace) (e.g. Last 2000). When 
modern education is inaccessible, the almajiri system affords an alternative avenue to ‘save’ 
both the child and one’s face as responsible parent.ii Also, moving to an urban area as almajiri 
may, for older youths with sufficient means and determination, be a strategy to acquire 
(belatedly) some modern knowledge: I met several Qur’anic students in their late teens and 
early twenties who attended adult literacy evening classes in Kano – an opportunity virtually 
absent in rural areas. 
Divorce is frequent and easy to achieve in Hausaland. Estimates suggest that over 75% of 
marriages in Kano City are divorced (Uwais et al. 2009, 20). Many marriages end in divorce 
because husbands fail to take care of the basic subsistence needs of their families, or because 
of fights between or over co-wives. In the case of divorce, the need may arise to ‘re-
accommodate’ children. Divorced mothers, who are expected to re-marry soon, can rarely 
move into new marriages with children from previous ones. Children left with fathers are at 
risk of suffering neglect, and abuse from stepmothers. High maternal mortality also renders 
children motherless (“Partnership for Transforming Health Systems” 2012). Girls may find 
themselves fostered out to relatives, or married off young. For boys, the almajiri system 
offers a way out under such constrained circumstances. 
Gathering the resources to launch an adult career – i.e. to build a room for prospective 
bride(s) and children, and to marry – affords a real challenge to adolescent boys and young 
men in an eroding rural economy where opportunities to earn cash income are scarce. 
Seasonal or permanent migration to the cities, which offer petty income opportunities as street 
vendors and odd-job men, promises redress. Migration, especially during the agriculturally 
unproductive dry season, is indeed a common strategy of Sahelian peasant households to 
reduce their subsistence burden and allows boys to acquire livelihood skills appropriate to the 
ecology of the region (Mortimore 1998; Mustapha and Meagher 1992). 
Families or caregivers make sense of their decisions to send their children to live as 
almajirai in the urban centres with reference not only to their high regard for Qur’anic 
learning (in a context where religious subjects are inadequately integrated into modern school 
curricula) but also mindful of the educational value of a certain degree of hardship for the 
social and moral training of their children (e.g. Last 2000). The next section engages with the 
ways in which the almajirai appropriate such narratives about the educational value of 
hardship for their own purposes.  
 
3.2. Escaping shame 
In a very status-conscious environment like Hausa society (Last 2000, 382), migrating 
means to remove oneself, at least to some extent and for some time, from one’s assigned 
position within the status hierarchy. This does not mean that migrants turn into ‘loose 
molecules’ (Kaplan 1994, 46) as many migrate within networks that connect them to their 
home localities and through which social control is, to some degree, maintained. However, 
coming to a noisy, crowded, and heavily populated city like Kano also means instances of 
anonymity, unstable hierarchies made in the instant, and the proliferation of novel strategies 
to signal status.  
For the almajirai, migrating entails both risks and opportunities in terms of social 
standing. For once, they can to some extent conceal individual life histories. These often 
engender shame as they are shaped by a lack of support from (supposedly responsible) social 
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elders as a consequence of poverty, divorce or death. Life in the city affords anonymity, and 
enrolment as almajiri doesn’t require an explanation in terms of personal circumstance: after 
all, searching for religiously enjoined knowledge is not an endeavour in need of justification. 
Moreover, as has been pointed out above, hardship is part and parcel of the 
educational ideology of the almajiri system. Children in Hausa society are seen as ‘beings 
who require disciplining in order to become human’, Last argues. Undisciplined children are 
perceived as animal-like as ‘they simply sleep, eat and drink’ (2000, 374). Without ‘external 
shaping’ in the form of discipline and physical hardship ‘a child is scarcely human, and 
certainly not a proper Muslim’ (376; see Schildkrout [1978] 2002). Strictness and physical 
punishment are perceived as necessary and even beneficial for a child and his learning, and 
while it is recognised that parents are reluctant to exert much harshness, this is perceived as 
weakness. Malam Ahmadu for example, Qur’anic teacher at Sabuwar Kofa where I lived 
during my stays in Kano City, explained his decision to teach almajirai rather than students 
from the neighbourhood to me with his experience that close-by parents could not help but 
interfere in the teaching. Rather than blaming them, he took this to be a structural problem to 
be solved by sending children away.  
Cultural norms that ascribe educative value to hardship provide a vocabulary with 
which almajirai can justify their deprived conditions, eschewing the familiar narratives of 
poverty and parental neglect. In this way, being an almajiri can attenuate the shame 
associated with poverty. After all haven’t the almajirai proven outstanding religious 
dedication by forgoing the (presumed) comforts of home for the sake of knowledge? This is 
the narrative the almajirai I got to know well were working towards. During script writing, 
for example, the boys involved in the film project invoked any number of social, cultural, and 
religious arguments to justify enrolment as almajiri: 
• At home, he [a child] becomes stubborn, quarrelsome with other children and 
disrespectful towards elders. If he’s told to go to school, he doesn’t go. He just goes 
for a stroll, annoying the people in the neighbourhood. 
• Some are worried about the kind of kids their children associate with. That is why 
they decide to take them to school. Because if they’d leave them at home, they may 
become spoiled, but if they take them to school someone is looking after them 
because it’s the malam’s [Qur’anic teacher] work to look after them. 
• Parents want their children to get to know their religion, and know people, and know 
how to live together with people.  
When the script advisor, a professional from the Kano film industry, suggested that 
destitution was indeed a factor underpinning the enrolment of children as almajirai, the boys 
nodded approval. Yet, they did not hesitate for a moment to take him up on his suggestion to 
disregard this aspect of the system in their script. On other occasions, the almajirai outright 
refuted explanations invoking poverty or difficult conditions at home (e.g. parental divorce or 
death) as reasons for almajiri enrolment. Nasiruiii (15 years) for instance contended that  
… especially now that there is boko [modern school], if you come for almajirci, some 
people think it’s because you don’t have food in your house, that’s why you come out to 
beg. But it’s not like that; it’s because you’re searching for knowledge.  
Habibu (15 years) refutes the claim of parental neglect, suggesting that  
people bring their children to Qur’anic school not because they hate them, but because 
they want them to have the knowledge. 
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I was surprised to find that even schoolmates who had been enrolled in the same 
Qur’anic school for years and shared their daily routines with each other as friends, knew very 
little about each other in terms of family background. Bashir for instance, did not know that 
Khalidu was orphaned and had become an almajiri as a consequence of parental death. They 
had been schoolmates for over two years and appeared to be quite close friends. 
My informants of course did not necessarily make an exemption for me from their 
strategies of concealment and often it was only after careful probing, or engaging other family 
members in the conversation, that I found out about the underlying material circumstances of 
a child’s first enrolment as almajiri. The young people themselves often prioritised religious 
and cultural values over material constraints when explaining their careers as almajirai.  
Idris, for example, in his early twenties, had enrolled as almajiri after only one month 
of secondary school. When I asked about the school change, he explained it in terms of the 
importance of religious knowledge in this world and the hereafter. Only when I probed 
whether any key event triggered his drop-out, he revealed that his father had died at the time. 
Isiyaku, in his early twenties and returned almajiri, whom I interviewed in the 
presence of his mother, explained to me that he dropped out of modern education to become 
an almajiri whereas his junior brother persisted through modern education as the latter had 
more of the kind of intelligence required for modern knowledge. His mother then chipped in 
explaining that Isiyaku had to drop out of modern education because his father was very ill at 
the time and the household financially strained. 
I do not mean to imply that people don’t mean what they say when they stress the 
importance of religious knowledge, or that almajiri enrolments are necessarily caused by 
acute household emergencies. Rather, my point here is that the almajiri system and its 
ideology can act as a way to save face and allow people to maintain a sense of dignity and 
purpose in difficult circumstances. 
 
3.3. New vulnerabilities 
At the same time, however, the almajirai as newcomers and strangers (as opposed to 
the ‘yan gari, the ‘children of the town’) are vulnerable to abuses they wouldn’t be exposed to 
back home. Being away from home may allow them to cover up their social elders’ failure to 
take appropriate care of them, and thus to evade the associated shame. Yet, in a society in 
which individuals derive their social standing from the people they ‘belong’ to (be it family 
members or patrons), being unable to display such belonging means to be vulnerable and 
defenceless. The term gata connotes a person whom you can legitimately expect to stand up 
as well as provide materially for you. The almajirai I conducted my research with often 
explained the abuses they suffered with reference to the apparent absence of such guardians or 
protectors. During the script writing process for the film, for instance, the participating boys 
noted that almajirai are often mistreated because 
people see he [the almajiri] doesn’t have a guardian/protector (gata), and if they mistreat 
him, nothing will happen to them. And the almajirai’s teachers want to live in peace with 
the people from town. That’s why even if almajirai have been mistreated, they’ll tell 
them to have patience. 
The almajirai felt emasculated particularly in their interactions with other young 
people in the neighbourhoods of their schools, including their employers’ children. These 
would often mock and bully almajirai with impunity. I would not go so far as to suggest it is 
considered legitimate to treat someone badly for lack of gata. But as an explanation for bad 
and heedless treatment it makes immediate sense to people. Command over and claims to 
other people’s respect, I would venture, inhere not in the individual, but in the social 
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hierarchy she or he belongs to. To fend off assaults on their dignity, the almajirai 
participating in the film project declared and asserted they too had their supporters and 
protectors rather than demanding that everyone should be treated with respect and dignity 
irrespective of whether or not he has gata. Buhari (ca. 20 years) for instance, part of the film 
production crew, proclaims in the end credits where the almajirai spell out their messages to 
the public: 
I want those people who abuse almajirai to understand that they also have people who 
care about them. 
There are other sources of vulnerability for almajirai apart from their difficulties in 
displaying ‘belonging’. Unlike in a village context where nearly everyone knows nearly 
everyone’s family background, in an urban environment anonymity characterises many 
encounters. Displays of ‘belonging’ have thus been complemented with novel ways of 
signalling one’s status. Demonstrations of wealth are of course a popular default option for 
those wishing to make claims to high rank: posh cars are the preserve of the rich; flashy 
mobile phones and glamorous clothes belong to the symbolic repertoire also of the somewhat 
less lavishly endowed. Finally, shows of one’s mastery of prestigious and hard-to-attain forms 
of knowledge – e.g. conversing in English (preferably in the presence of Hausa-only 
speakers!), reciting the Qur’an in the qira’a of Hafs (rather than the ‘folk’ Warsh version), or 
at least greeting (‘Assalamu alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh’) with an Arabic accent – 
work effectively to create instantaneous hierarchies. Unfortunately, almajirai mostly lack the 
economic and cultural capital required to participate in such new styles of differentiation. For 
the most part they don’t command the financial resources for displays of wealth, and 
‘modern’ forms of knowledge are difficult to acquire, especially for those attending only 
Qur’anic school. All together, there is little to protect the almajirai from lingering at the 
bottom of the status hierarchy and thus becoming easy prey for those searching for 
scapegoats. Being blamed for incidents in their neighbourhoods is an experience shared by 
many almajirai: 
Some offences, it’s not an almajiri who committed them; it’s the people/kids from town 
(‘yan gari). But they’ll just say an almajiri committed it, if there’s a school close-by, 
they’ll just go and tell the malam (Qur’anic teacher): look what your almajirai did, 
whereas it wasn’t them who did it. The people from the neighbourhood don’t see their 
own children’s faults. (Auwalu, late teens, during script writing) 
The almajirai I conducted my research with were not only aware of the attitudes of the 
public towards them but felt many of the accusations were unwarranted. The youths involved 
in the film project for instance were upset about having to serve as scapegoat. Without 
someone answering for them close-by, they felt they had become fair game for unfair 
accusations. How upset the almajirai participating in the film project were about being denied 
respect becomes apparent in the messages to the public they included in the end credits of the 
film. Six of the nine participants voice respect as their biggest worry and call for a more 
sympathetic view on almajirai, for example: 
• I want those who think almajirai are bad people to know that they aren’t. Either 
speak good about us or keep quiet. (Kabiru) 
• I call upon you to stop accusing almajirai of things they didn’t do. Please inquire 
first before you just accuse the almajirai. (Naziru) 
• I call upon those people who insult us, who think we are useless, to stop as of 
today, for the sake of God. (Auwalu) 
 12 
As a matter of fact, the truth content of accusations against the almajirai is secondary 
to my argument that it is easy and, for many, convenient to resort to scapegoating almajirai. 
As long as the almajirai can be blamed for petty incidents in their neighbourhoods, there will 
be no need for potentially tedious confrontations with the parents of other youngsters. As long 
as the inadequacies of the almajiri system serve to ‘explain’ the Boko Haram related violence 
discussed earlier, it is possible to put more complicated questions about poverty, inequality, 
and alienation on the back burner. This brings me back to the argument made at the beginning 
of this paper that in an increasingly individualistic social environment, the burden of blame is 
easily put on individuals, especially the poor, rather than on the social ills constraining their 




Mobility is a contradictory resource for the almajirai. They can draw on it to seize 
educational and income opportunities missing at home, or to escape from situations in which 
there is no other way forward. Modern education in rural areas is both low in quality and 
costly for poor households, and its returns in terms of future employment are uncertain. The 
almajiri system offers an alternative educational avenue. An eroding agricultural economy 
offers few if any cash income opportunities for young people. Migration to the city promises 
redress as young people can get by as household helps, odd-job men or street vendors. High 
rates of divorce and parental death further precipitate children to leave home. Contrary to the 
widespread idea of ‘education’ as a preparatory phase whose fruits are to be reaped in the 
future, the almajiri system offers solutions for the challenges of daily subsistence in the here 
and now. However, whether it entails future benefits for its students is uncertain. 
Migration grants the almajirai access to self-conceptions as migrants in search of 
sacred knowledge. Yet, such dignified notions compete with their negative mirror image. 
Often, the almajirai are portrayed as the product of parental backwardness and neglect, and as 
such prone to become nuisances, troublemakers and – against the backdrop of escalating Boko 
Haram related violence – terrorist cannon fodder. Surprisingly, the notions espoused by the 
almajirai and by their opponents have more in common than one would prima facie expect: 
I have argued that as a consequence of economic and societal change in Nigeria, the 
poor are often blamed for their squalor as economic success is considered a result of 
individual industry and merit rather than one’s position within larger social determinants of 
privilege and opportunity. Paradoxically, in their attempts to defend their sense of self and 
self-worth, the almajirai play into the hands of such logics that delegitimise them. By 
embracing self-conceptions as devoted searchers for sacred knowledge, ironically, they 
become more vulnerable. They adopt a trope that prioritises the cultural and religious aspects 
of the almajiri system over its material bases. Thereby, they may unwittingly buttress 
culturalist explanations, which, changed into the negative, evoke ‘backward’ educational 
aspirations and neglectful and ignorant parents. Such culturalist explanations, in turn, invite 
punitive responses from governments. The proposed ban on the almajiri system is a case in 
point. 
It is easily comprehensible that the almajirai adopt the trope of devout migratory 
scholars given the daily assaults on their dignity and identity that they have to fend off. It is, 
however, tragic in that it keeps off the table a debate about the structural causes of the poverty 
afflicting the constituencies that opt for the almajiri system. Such a debate would, however, 
be important in order to achieve a change for the better for the almajirai and their families. 
In conclusion, it is important to be mindful of the ways in which discourses that 
stigmatise poor young migrants may develop a dynamic of their own. Shame has been argued 
to be at the ‘irreducible absolutist core’ of poverty across cultures (e.g. Sen 1983, 159), and 
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growing inequality is one of the biggest challenges of our time. Young migrants’ movements 
are often linked to socioeconomic disparities between ‘home’ and ‘host’ regions or 
households, and stigma is a widely shared experience. Given this context, it is particularly 
important to better understand their struggles for dignity and (self-) respect. In order to defend 
their sense of self, young migrants may embrace self-conceptions which downplay the role of 
structural constraints in their lives. They may salvage their sense of purpose by portraying 
themselves as wilful and independent agents, thereby risking that others accuse them of a 
‘culture of poverty’. This paper has shown how important it is to bring to the fore the role that 
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i Living in relative poverty is defined as living on 2/3 or less of mean per capita expenditure. 
ii Qur’anic/Islamiyya schools are of course available also in rural areas. For the reasoning that makes 
enrolment away from home appear more appropriate, see section 3.2.. 
iii I changed the names of informants where I felt it necessary to protect their identity. Where 
informants were comfortable with statements being publicised in their name and where I 
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